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FOREWORD
EMPIRICAL RESEARCH AND THE ISSUE
OF JURY COMPETENCE
NEILJ. VIDMAR*

This issue of Law and Contemporary Problems focuses on the question of jury
competence. Some of the articles are concerned with civil juries and some
with criminal juries. All are based upon empirical research.
The jury system is, and always has been, a controversial institution. I Many
contemporary critics would endorse Judge Jerome Frank's assertion that the
jury applies law it doesn't understand to facts it can't get straight.2 The civil
jury has received the most criticism. A leader of the attack during the 1970's
and 1980's was former Chief Justice Warren Burger, who complained that
jurors are not competent to deal with the complex disputes that come to trial
in the federal courts.3 A series of cases have raised the question of whether
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1. See generally V. HANS & N. VIDMAR, JUDGI&G THE JURY (1986); H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, THE
AMERICANJURY (1966); L. MOORE, THEJURY, TOOL OF KINGS, PALLADIUM OF LIBERTY (1973); Howe,
juries as judges of Criminal Law, 52 HARV. L. REV. 582 (1939).
2. J. FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL: MYTH AND REALITY IN AMERICAN JUSTICE (1945). A more
detailed critique can be found in Judge Frank's opinion in Skidmore v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad, 167
F.2d 54 (2d Cir. 1948).
3. Burger, The State of the Federaljudiciary, 57 A.B.A. J. 855 (1971); Burger, Is Our jury System
Working?, 118 READERS DIGEST 126 (1981). Chief Justice Burger was also concerned about the
administrative and financial burdens that the civil jury system imposed on the courts. For discussion
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there should be a complexity exception to the seventh amendment right to a
jury trial in civil matters. 4 Academic writings also pillory the civil jury. In a
HarvardLaw Review article addressing the perceived ills besetting the courts,
Albert Alschuler placed considerable blame for these problems on "the
lawlessness of our jury system." '5 In the mass media and in trade publications
6
the civil jury is adjudged to be capricious, biased, and unintelligent.
The criminal jury is not so roundly and consistently attacked as the civil
jury, but questions are raised about whether it can properly evaluate complex
evidentiary questions, such as those presented in insanity defense or sexual
assault cases. 7 Additional, more limited, criticisms involve matters such as the
jury's ability to deal appropriately with the defendant's prior criminal record, 8
joinder, 9 and scientific evidence.' 0
These various assertions are statements about what juries actually do and
are, therefore, open to empirical examination. In the light of actual data they
may or may not prove to be valid. It is clear, however, that many of the
assertions have been made without the benefit of any empirical data; in other
instances empirical findings have been misconstrued or the limitations of the
particular data sets have been ignored.'' This is not to suggest that the task
of empirical assessment is easy or without the possibility of controversy.
Multiple issues are involved in assessing jury competence and multiple
standards can be applied when studying these issues. For example, does the
question of competence involve the jury's ability to assess causality,
negligence, damages, or scientific evidence? Is the standard against which
performance is to be assessed an absolute standard, the relative performance
of a judge, some other tribunal, or a blue ribbon jury?' 2

An additional

related to Burger's concerns, see Vidmar, Assessing the Impact of Statistical Evidence, A Social Science
Perspective, in THE EVOLVING ROLE OF STATISTICAL ASSESSMENTS AS EVIDENCE IN THE COURTS 294 (S.

Fienberg ed. 1989).
4. An excellent review of these cases and the issues that they involve is contained in Sperlich,
The Case for Preserving Trial by jury in Complex Civil Litigation, 65 JUDICATURE 394 (1982).

5. Alschuler, The Shortage of Adjudicative Services and the Need for a Two-Tier Trial System in Civil
Cases, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1808 (1986).
6. Discussion of these matters is contained in Daniels, The Question of Jury Competence and the
Politics of CivilJustice Reform: Symbols, Rhetoric, and Agenda-Building, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn
1989, at 269. See also Galanter,Jury Shadows: Reflections on the CivilJury and the "Litigation Explosion ", in
FINAL REPORT OF THE 1986 CHIEF JUSTICE EARL WARREN CONFERENCE, THE AMERICAN CIVIL JURY,

ROSCOE POUND FOUNDATION (1988); Drazan, The Case for Special Juries in Toxic Tort Litigation, 72

292 (1989).
7. See Hans & Vidmar, supra note 1, at chs. 12, 13, 14.
8. See Note, Social Science Findings and the Jury's Ability to Disregard Under the Federal Rules of
Evidence, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1989, at 341.
9. Note, Rethinking CriminalJoinder: An Analysis of the Empirical Research and Its Implications for
Justice, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1989, ai 325.
10. See Imwinkelried,Judge Versus Jury: Who Should Decide Questions of Preliminary Facts Conditioning
the Admissibility of Scientific Evidence?, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 577 (1984); Imwinkelried, The Standard
for Admitting Scientific Evidence: A Critiquefrom the Perspective of Juror Psychology, 100 MIL. L. REV. 99
(1983); Thompson, Are juries Competent to Evaluate Statistical Evidence?, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.,
Autumn 1989, at 9.
I1. See Daniels, supra note 6.
12. The idea of civil juries composed of persons with special education or skills bearing on
complex cases has been occasionally discussed as a remedy for the perceived incompetence of juries
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question involves a value judgment: How much variation from the standard,
whatever it is, are we going to allow before concluding that the jury is not
competent? The point, of course, is that empirical data can inform debate but
cannot independently resolve it. A final issue flows from any conclusion that
jury performance does not comport with the standard that is chosen. What
action is to be taken? Is the performance so bad that we should consider
alternatives to the jury? Is it possible to modify current procedures to
improve jury performance? Should the poor performance simply be tolerated
as the price paid for the other functions that the jury serves? All of these
questions are addressed to varying degrees in the articles that follow, but the
reader is urged to keep them in mind when contemplating the results of the
various studies.
EMPIRICAL WORK DURING THE PAST QUARTER CENTURY

Although there were a few studies of jury behavior as far back as the
1930's, the systematic empirical study of the jury is usually dated from the
University of Chicago Jury Project, which began in the 1950's. 13 The project
gained widespread public recognition with the publication of Kalven and
Zeisel's landmark book, The American Jury, 14 in 1966 and Simon's The Jury and
the Defense of Insanity in 1967.15
The research reported in The American Jury was based on a comparison of
the verdicts that juries rendered in over 3000 criminal trials around the
United States with the verdict that the trial judge would have rendered if the
case had been heard without a jury. In the cases studied, judge and jury
agreed 78 percent of the time. In the cases where there was disagreement the
jury was about six times as likely to favor the defendant as the prosecution.
By comparing other data, such as the judge's estimate of the difficulty of the
case, Kalven and Zeisel drew the conclusion that judge-jury disagreement was
seldom due to a failure of the jury to understand the evidence. Instead, it was
because the jury applied a different set of values in deciding the case.
The Chicago Jury Project also studied more than 6000 civil jury verdicts. 16

The findings indicated that judge-jury agreement was 78 percent, the same as
in criminal juries, and in the cases of disagreement the jury favored the
defendant about as often as the plaintiff. On the issue of damages, jury
awards averaged about 20 percent higher than what the judge would have
awarded.
in complex cases. Drazan, supra note 6; Nordenberg & Lundburg, Decision Making in Complex Federal
Civil Cases: Two Alternatives to the Traditional Jury, 65 JUDICATURE 430 (1982); Note, The Casefor Special
Juries in Complex Litigation, 89 YALE LJ. 1155 (1980).
13. A description of the project and its scope is contained in Broeder, The University of Chicago
Jury Project, 38 NEB. L. REV. 744 (1959).
14. H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, supra note 1.
15. R. SIMON, THE JURY AND THE DEFENSE OF INSANITY (1967).
16. Kalven, The Dignity of the CivilJury, 50 VA. L. REV. 1055 (1964).
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Simons' study of the insanity defense was based upon realistic simulations
of criminal trials using over 1000 jurors drawn from actual jury pools. 17 The
findings showed juries responding sensitively to both the law and the
evidence.
The Chicago Jury Project findings suggested that on the whole the jury
was a competent arbiter of the matters that were brought before it. Because
of the size of the data sets and the thoroughness and insightfulness of the
analyses, the Chicago Jury Project is considered, to this day, to be our best
evidence on the issue of jury competence. Yet, the age of the Chicago
findings may limit their applicability to controversies about the contemporary
jury. The intervening decades have produced substantial changes that could,
and probably do, have a bearing on the ability of juries to carry out the tasks
assigned to them. Consider a partial listing of these changes.
In some jurisdictions the size of the jury has been reduced from twelve to
six members. In addition, many jurisdictions no longer require that juries
reach their decisions by a unanimous verdict. Jury panels are now more
representative of the population than in the 1950's and 1960's. Changes have
occurred in the nature of cases that are tried to juries, their complexity, and
their length. Substantive laws have been altered, such as shifts from
contributory to comparative negligence and the institution of the verdict of
guilty but mentally ill. There have been changes in procedural laws, such as
rape shield statutes. The kinds of evidence that juries hear have also evolved:
Advances in technologies have increased the use of scientific evidence;
lawyers have become increasingly sophisticated in developing multiple
theories of causality and negligence; and social science testimony is almost
routinely admitted into evidence. In short, the makeup of the jury, the
evidence, and the context in which it operates today is very different from
when the Chicago Jury Project data were collected. An attempt to replicate
the Chicago study is overdue.
Although the University of Chicago studies still strongly influence our
thinking about jury competence, there has been no recent dearth of research
on various aspects ofjury behavior. During the last decade alone hundreds of
articles' 8 and a number of books I' on the subject have been published. New
theoretical developments in the social sciences, particularly social psychology,
17. R. SIMON, supra note 15.
18. The Social Sciences Citation Index subject index lists 242 references under "juror" and 612
references under "jury" in the years 1981 to 1985. Recognizing that articles frequently receive
multiple listings, depending upon the topics contained in their titles, we can arbitrarily divide these
numbers by three (three listings per article) and arrive at a figure of 284 articles dealing with jurors
or juries. Using the same logic the estimate for 1988 is 45 articles. In 1989 Psychological Abstracts
alone listed thirty-two articles dealing with juries. The first twelve volumes of Law and Human
Behavior (1977-1988), consisting of four issues per year, averages slightly more than one article per
issue with "jury" or "juror" in the title.
19. J. BALDWIN & M. MCCONVILLE, JURY TRIALS (1979); J. GUINTHER, THE JURY IN AMERICA
(1988); M. SAKS, JURY VERDICTS (1977); V. HANS & N. VIDMAR, supra note 1; R. HASTIE, S. PENROD &
N. PENNINGTON, INSIDE THE JURY (1983); S. KASSIN & L. WRIGHTSMAN, [HE AMERICAN JURY ON TRIAL:
PSYCHOLOGICAL. PERSPECTIVES (1988).
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have provided insights about jury decisionmaking processes. Additionally,
judges and practicing lawyers have shown increased interest in what empirical
research might discover. For this reason, they have aided researchers and, in
some instances, have helped to generate innovative experiments. Some of
*this research literature appears to corroborate the conclusions of The American
Jury but some of it raises questions about how well juries perform their task.
This symposium is intended to further our knowledge about jury
competence. The articles review research and theory bearing on a number of
the issues raised in legal debates about the jury.
OVERVIEW OF THE ARTICLES

The first four articles in the issue address the problem of how juries
respond to scientific evidence. Over the past fifteen years there has been a
dramatic increase in both the types and amount of scientific evidence
introduced at trial. 20 The evaluation of scientific evidence requires a different
form of analysis and decisionmaking than that required with other forms of
evidence. The central questions raised by these developments are whether
the jury can be aided by the evidence, whether it is capable of understanding
the evidence, and whether it is capable of using it in a legally proper way.
William Thompson addresses the issue of statistical evidence. Most
forensic science evidence is probabilistic in nature. He argues that this fact
raises several concerns about the ability of juries to deal with statistical
evidence: They may overestimate or underestimate its value as evidence; they
may be insensitive to important statistical variations that affect the strength of
the evidence; and they may be insensitive to partial redundancies between
statistical and nonstatistical evidence. He delineates the basic concepts
associated with these questions and then describes a series of studies that
shed light on how juries respond to statistical information.
In the next article, Steven Penrod and Brian Cutler deal with the impact of
expert testimony about eyewitness reliability. Experimental psychologists
have studied in detail many of the factors that may affect the reliability of
eyewitness identifications. As this body of knowledge has developed, courts
have increasingly shown a willingness to accept expert testimony on the
subject. Such testimony has raised controversy not only among judges and
legal critics, but also within the community of psychologists. Questions have
arisen about whether the body of knowledge on eyewitness reliability is
sufficiently developed to be applied in legal settings; whether the knowledge,
in any event, is beyond the ken of the jurors; and whether the impact on the
jury is likely to be more prejudicial than probative. Penrod and Cutler
THE EVOLVING ROLE OF STATISTICAL ASSESSMENTS AS EVIDENCE IN THE COURTS (S. Fienberg
SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE (1986); M. SAKS & R. VAN DUIZEND,
THE USE OF SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE IN LITIGATION (1983); Decker, Expert Services in the Defense of Crminal
20.

ed. 1989); P. GIANELLI & E. IMWINKELRIED,

Cases: The Constitutional and Statutory Rights of Indigents, 51 U. CIN. L. REV. 574 (1982); Gianelli, The
Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United States, A Half Century Later, 80 COLUM. L. REV.

1197 (1980).
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describe their own research and the research of others on each of these
questions.
The evidence about eyewitness reliability discussed by Penrod and Cutler
is one instance of a generic category of social science evidence that Walker
and Monahan have recently labeled "social framework" evidence. 2' Social
framework evidence is offered to provide the jury with information about the
social and psychological context in which contested adjudicative facts
occurred. Other examples of social framework evidence include testimony
about the characteristics of victims of child sex abuse, rape, and spousal
abuse.
Robert Mosteller's contribution to this symposium concerns the legal
doctrines that govern the admissibility of social framework evidence.
Mosteller analyzes these doctrines and then contrasts testimony involving
sexual abuse of children with that involving rape victims. He concludes by
raising empirical questions about jury responses to this type of evidence.
The article by Neil Vidmar and Regina Schuller also explores social
framework evidence. It reviews research literature describing jury awareness
of issues involving battered women, rape victims, and eyewitness reliability,
and jury behavior in response to expert testimony on these subjects. Jury
reactions to other types of expert testimony are also considered. The goal of
this review was to uncover any similarities in jury responses to expert
evidence in different contexts.
Valerie Hans' article shifts our attention to the issue of how juries assess
corporate responsibility. It has been charged that juries are biased against
corporate defendants and, alternatively, that they are too lenient in cases
involving corporate wrongdoing. Hans analyzes the arguments on both sides
of this controversy and discusses research findings on the subject. She
concludes by setting forth a research agenda to improve our understanding of
judgments about corporate responsibility.
Despite the fact that the jury is a deliberative body, surprisingly few of the
many studies devoted to jury behavior have attempted to examine directly the
process by which juries reach decisions. Given legal constraints, studies of the
process must be accomplished through simulation experiments. Phoebe
Ellsworth's article shows that we can learn a great deal about the deliberation
process through simulations. Ellsworth contrasts juries' understanding of the
evidence with their understanding of the law in regard to a murder trial.
The means by which juries arrive at damage awards has also been
neglected in empirical research. This neglect seems odd since damages-the
bottom line in the civil jury trial-are what actually fuels much of the criticism
of the jury sfstem. Edith Greene's article begins to fill this gap in our
knowledge. She draws upon research using juror interviews and simulation
studies to consider alternate models of how juries arrive at their awards.
21. Walker & Monahan, Social Frameworks: A New Age of Social Science in Law, 73 VA. L. REv. 559
(1987).
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Shari Diamond, Jonathan Casper, and Lynne Ostergren's article looks at
the legal rules intended to restrain the jury by denying the jurors access to
certain kinds of evidence thought to be overly prejudicial. How effective is
this "blindfolding" and does it have unintended consequences? Consistent
with other research reported in this issue, the studies that Diamond, Casper,
and Ostergren review show the jury as an active decisionmaker, utilizing the
knowledge and assumptions of its constituents members. This fact has
important consequences for attempts to construct rules intended to control
how juries arrive at their verdicts.
The articles by Stephen Daniels and Judyth Pendell should be viewed as a
unit. Daniels examines the contemporary charges of jury incompetence from
a political perspective. He argues that powerful lobbies from the insurance
industry, manufacturers, and certain professional groups, particularly doctors,
have made the jury the public scapegoat for a perceived crisis in the civil
justice system. He documents instances in which exaggerated stories and
misinterpreted data have been presented to policymakers and the public to
create, he argues, the appearance of a crisis and the need for major legal
reforms. As part of the documentation for his article, he wanted to reproduce
some advertisements from insurance companies.
The student editors of Law and Contemporary Problems contacted the
companies for permission to reproduce the advertisements. The Corporate
Communications division of Aetna Life and Casualty Insurance Company
gave permission to reprint its advertisements only if it was allowed to write a
reply to Daniels' article.2 2 I had several conversations with Joyce Rutledge,
the General Editor of Law and Contemporary Problems, and with Stephen Daniels
about the appropriateness of this unusual request. We decided that we would
consider an article from Aetna if it met certain standards, but also that Daniels
should be allowed to write a reply, and that I should relate the history of the
Pendell article in this foreword.
Despite some lingering reservations, 2 3 I am mostly content with our
course of action. Daniels was able to include the Aetna advertisements in his
article. The Pendell piece calls for research on procedural reforms intended
22. The letter of permission, dated January 16, 1990, read, in part, as follows:
Permission is granted subject to the following conditions:
(1) The ads must run verbatim and without any captions or explanations. We agree it will
be much more helpful to your readers to see the ads than to read descriptions, but they
must speak for themselves.
(2) An appropriate footnote must be added on the pages where the ads appear, as follows:
"The advertisements are reprinted with permission from Aetna Life and Casualty Company.
Aetna's own views on the jury system are presented in a companion article on page -(3)

Our article is published in the same issue .... We do feel . . . that the spirit and the

reality of fairness will be best served if our article appears in the same issue where our ads
are scrutinized-hence condition 3.
Perhaps you could ascertain the feasibility of our purchasing reprints of the two articles-or
extra copies of theJournal issue if that is more cost efficient. Interested in purchasing 1500
copies.
23. The most important is whether we should have acceded to Aetna's conditions in the first
place.

8
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to enhance jury competence, a position that is consistent with the empirical
focus of this symposium. I leave it to the reader to judge whether the history
behind the Pendell article helps to support or refute Daniels' thesis.
Two student notes appear in the symposium. One, by James Farrin, is
concerned with research on criminal joinder. The other, by Lisa Eichhorn,
considers the jury's ability to follow a judge's admonition to disregard
evidence.
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